IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT
FOR HARDEE, HIGHLANDS, AND
POLK COUNTY, FLORIDA

Case No. GC-G00-4163

BANKERS FINANCIAL CORPORATION, INC.,

Petitioner,

vs.

CITY OF LAKELAND, a municipal corporation of the state of Florida,

Respondent.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

This matter came before the court on a petition for writ of certiorari filed by Petitioner, Bankers Financial Corporation, Inc. (Bankers) on November 15, 2000. Bankers seeks review of the ruling of the Lakeland City Commission (the City) granting conditional approval of a proposed zoning change. This court convened oral arguments in this cause on January 9, 2001. This court has jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.100. Certiorari is granted. The ruling below is quashed, and this cause is remanded.

I.

The property at issue is a twenty-five acre parcel in north Lakeland owned by PNC Realty Holding Company of Florida. It is the last undeveloped parcel in the Carpenter=s Home Planned Unit Development (PUD). The parcel is designated residential medium with a tentative PUD approval of 369 multi-family units, and 2,252 vehicle trips. The proposed PUD includes 286 multi-family units and 1,896 vehicle trips. Because the parcel has one point of ingress and egress at Heatherpoint Drive and Carpenters Way, the planning and zoning staff recommended improvement to that intersection to handle the increased traffic. Bankers agreed to make the recommended improvements.

On June 20, 2000, Bankers presented their proposal to the City of Lakeland Planning and Zoning Board. At the public meeting on July 18, 2000, the Planning and Zoning Board voted to deny the proposal.

Bankers appealed the ruling of the Planning and Zoning Board to the City. The City convened a public hearing on September 18, 2000 at which Bankers presented evidence that the proposal was in compliance with the City of Lakeland Comprehensive Plan and the Lakeland Land Development Regulations. In addition, they presented the testimony of three traffic engineers who testified as experts. Bankers= outside expert, the City=s traffic engineer, and the City=s traffic engineering consultant each testified that traffic generated from the project would be concurrent with the Lakeland Land Development Regulations.

During the meeting, the City discussed the possibility of Banker=s securing alternate access from the east over private land not included in the Carpenter=s Home PUD. The city attorney advised the City that such option was beyond the scope of the application. The City then heard testimony from local residents in opposition of the project.

Six citizens spoke regarding the anticipated traffic impact. None of the six testified as experts or traffic engineers; none used the approved methodology for measuring traffic, and only one submitted documentation. At the close of the discussion, the City voted to continue the meeting until October 16, 2000 to allow Bankers time to negotiate eastern access. They voted to close the public hearing portion of the meeting after agreeing that everyone had had ample opportunity to be heard on the proposal. They agreed to reconvene for the sole purpose of hearing Bankers= report regarding eastern access at the October meeting.

Prior to October 16, Bankers became aware of the City=s intention to re-open the hearing to take additional testimony. Bankers presented their objections in a letter to the City on October 6. When the hearing reconvened, the City acknowledged that they had voted to close the public hearing, but voted to re-open the hearing to allow additional testimony. Counsel for Bankers re-stated his objection on the record to the City hearing additional testimony.

After further discussion, the City entertained a motion to grant approval conditioned on Banker=s securing eastern ingress and egress while retaining western ingress and egress. That motion failed. Next, they entertained a motion to approve the proposal conditioned on Banker=s securing eastern ingress and egress while denying Banker=s existing property rights to western ingress and egress. That motion passed. Bankers filed this petition seeking reversal of the City=s ruling and a cash award for denial of ingress and egress on Heatherpoint Drive and Carpenter=s Way.

II.

Common law certiorari is available in the circuit court to review the actions of local administrative bodies which are not governed by the Florida Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (2000). DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957). Certiorari is an extraordinary writ reserved for those situations in which Athere has been a violation of a clearly established principal of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.@ Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 1983). Review in the circuit court is limited to the following: (1) whether procedural due process had been accorded; (2) whether the essential requirements of the law are observed; and (3) whether the findings and judgement are supported by competent substantial evidence on the record. Haines City Community Development v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995).

A landowner seeking to re-zone must establish by competent substantial evidence that the proposal is consistent with the comprehensive plan and complies with local zoning regulations. Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 473 (Fla. 1993). The zoning authority may deny the proposal based upon competent substantial evidence that the existing zoning classification accomplishes a legitimate public purpose. Id. at 476.

III.

A. Procedural Due Process

Bankers alleges that the City failed to provide adequate notice of the October 16 meeting. At the close of the September 18 meeting on Banker=s proposal, the City voted to close the public hearing and reconvene to hear Bankers= report on eastern access. It appears from the record that no other notice was given. The City maintains that it committed no due process violation because it has the authority to re-open a public hearing.

The issue raised by these facts is whether the City had the authority to change the agenda rather than whether they provided adequate notice. Section 286.0105, Florida Statutes (2000) requires a city commission to give public notice of the date, time, location as well as the fact that the meeting is open to the public. The date, time and location of the hearing were as announced in September; accordingly, the City=s announcement of the October 16 meeting was adequate. However, the Sunshine Law does not require the City to give notice of a potential deviation as long as the meeting is properly noticed because a city commission is not governed by the Florida APA. 2 Fla. Jur. 2d. ' 47 Administrative Law (1998); Law and Information Services, Inc. v. City of Riviera Beach, 670 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Therefore, that the City changed its agenda without prior notice does not establish a due process violation.

B. Competent Substantial Evidence.

At the October meeting, the City voted to approve the proposal conditioned upon Bankers securing eastern ingress and egress rights across private lands while denying Bankers the use of their existing rights to western ingress and egress. Bankers argues that the record contains no competent evidence supporting the City=s decision. This court agrees.

When the meeting reconvened in October, a group of homeowners presented their objections along with an engineer who testified regarding traffic counts in the area to the west of the parcel. However, the engineer presented no methodology substantiating his study.

First, lay witness testimony on technical matters such as traffic counts is not competent evidence. City of Apopka v. Orange County, 299 So. 2d 657, 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (finding that opinions of residents are not factual evidence and do not provide competent evidence for denial of zoning change). Second, expert testimony which is not supported by methodology, studies, or literature is inadmissible as expert testimony. Brito v. County of Palm Beach, 753 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the petition for writ of certiorari is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that the ruling of the Lakeland City Commission is QUASHED and this cause is REMANDED.

ORDERED February 2001.

Charles B. Curry
Chief Judge