APPEAL NO:AA-0065

Case No: MM98-06594A-XX

JEANETTE GASKINS,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

This is an appeal of a jury verdict convicting Jeanette Gaskins, Appellant, of resisting an officer without violence in the county court of Polk County, Judge Steven Selph presiding. The trial court denied defense counsel’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. Appellant raises one issue on appeal; whether the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal. This court has jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(c)(1)(A). The verdict and sentence of the county court is affirmed.

The following facts are from the trial testimony of the state’s only witness, Officer Regina Toney. Officer Regina Toney and several other officers of the Polk County Sheriff’s Office were on foot patrol on 37^th Street in Winter Haven on the evening of July 16, 1998. The officers parked their patrol cars at one end of the street and began the patrol. As Officer Toney walked along 37^th Street, Appellant and several other residents, who were outside in their yards, asked her why the officers were there.

As Officer Toney walked past Appellant’s home, she began talking with Jerome Barnes as he sat in Appellant’s yard. Barnes also asked why the police were there and stated that he knew he did not have any outstanding warrants. He told the officer that she could check, and Officer Toney ran a warrant check on Barnes. The search returned no warrants, but shortly thereafter, a teletype operator informed Officer Toney by radio that Barnes was the Respondent, and Appellant was the petitioner on a domestic violence injunction.

As Officer Toney tried to discuss the circumstances of the injunction with Barnes on the street in front of Appellant’s home, Appellant came out of her yard and inserted herself in the discussion. Appellant insisted that the injunction had been dropped and that Officer Toney should concern herself with the drug traffic on that street. Appellant stated that she had court papers inside her home, and Officer Toney asked her to get them. Instead, Appellant remained and continued to insist that the matter had been resolved. Officer Toney then escorted Appellant to her front door and asked her to get the papers. Officer Toney returned to the street and asked Barnes about the injunction, and whether he had a recent court date. Appellant returned with papers which provided no information pertinent to the injunction.

With other deputies and her supervisors present, Officer Toney repeatedly asked Appellant to stay back so that she could talk with Barnes. She explained to Appellant that she had information which conflicted with what Appellant and Barnes were saying. When Appellant again inserted herself in the discussion, Officer Toney arrested Appellant and placed her in the patrol car. Officer Toney then telephoned the teletype operator to verify the injunction. The operator confirmed that the injunction was still active.

In moving for a judgment of acquittal, the movant admits facts in evidence and every conclusion favorable to the state’s case that the jury might reasonably infer. State v. Blanco, 702 So.2d 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). To succeed, the state must present prima facie evidence that the officer had a reasonable and objective suspicion of criminal activity, and that the accused interfered with the officer’s attempt to arrest or detain a suspect. M.M. v. State, 674 So.2d 883 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). On appeal, the state is entitled to have the reviewing court view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. Hartman v. State, 728 So.2d 782 (Fla. 4^th DCA 1999).

An officer must state in particular and objective terms his or her reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Harris v. State, 647 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1994). Officer Toney testified that her initial contact with Barnes involved no suspicion of criminal activity. Barnes told the officer that she could check his license for warrants. The search returned no warrants. After Officer Toney completed the search, a teletype operator notified her by radio that Appellant was the petitioner and Barnes was the respondent on an injunction for protection against domestic violence. She commenced an investigation to determine whether Barnes was in fact in violation.

The second district held that evidence of a defendant yelling profanity and continually refusing to leave is sufficient to support a finding of interferance with an officer. M.M. v. State, 674 So.2d 883 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Officer Toney attempted to question Barnes about the injunction but she was repeatedly interrupted by Appellant. Officer Toney asked several times for Appellant to stand away from the area where she questioned Barnes. Appellant repeatedly refused. Officer Toney testified that she was unable to complete her investigation because Appellant repeatedly inserted herself in the conversation between Officer Toney and Barnes. Only after Officer Toney arrested and placed Appellant in the patrol car was she able to complete the investigation and confirm the validity of the injunction.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant her motion for judgment of acquittal because, she argues, the state failed to show the necessary elements of the offense. The state demonstrated at trial that the officer was notified of an injunction which involved Appellant and Barnes. After receiving notice of the injunction, the officer began an investigation to determine whether Barnes was in violation. The officer was unable to complete the investigation because of Appellant’s speech and conduct.

Accordingly, the order of the county court is AFFIRMED.

ORDERED this day of October 1999.

Charles B. Curry

Chief Judge