County Case No.: TT00-000431-WH
Appeal No.: DD-26
STANLEY THOMAS,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
This is an appeal from the county court of Polk County, Judge Mary Catherine Green presiding. Appellant Stanley Thomas argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. This court has jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030. The ruling of the county court is affirmed.
I.
On July 6, 2000, Officer King observed a vehicle failing to stop at a stop sign. (T4) King stopped the vehicle. When King ran a check on the appellant=s driver=s license, he learned that it had been suspended. (T5) King issued citations for driving with a suspended license and failing to stop at a stop sign. (T 5)
At trial, the state introduced a certified copy of the appellant=s driving record into evidence. (T5) The record indicated that the appellant=s license was suspended on April 10th for failing to pay child support. (T59) Additionally, the address on the uniform traffic citation, 1800 3rd Court, East, was the same address listed on the certified copy of the driving record. (T5) As of March 5, 2001, two days prior to the trial, the address on the driving printout was still 1800 3rd Court, East. (R11)
The appellant testified that he had moved from 1800 3rd Court, East, sometime between April and June, 2000. (T 9) Appellant testified that his current address was 19 Carrie Boulevard and that he provided the Division of Motor Vehicles with the new address. (T 9, 12) The appellant=s ID card still had the 1800 3rd Court, East address as of the date of trial. (T 12) The appellant further testified that he did not receive notice that his license had been suspended prior to July 6, 2000. (T 9) The appellant testified that his child support payments were current during July 2000. (T 9)
At the close of the state=s cases, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal arguing that the state had failed to prove that the appellant had knowledge that his driver=s license was suspended. (T 14) The trial court denied the motion. The court found the appellant guilty of driving while license suspended. The court sentenced him to thirty days of weekend work release. (T 19) Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying the appellant=s motion for judgment of acquittal because the state did not present sufficient evidence to show that the appellant knowingly drove while his license was suspended and/or the rebuttable presumption of knowledge does not apply in this case.
II.
A judgment of conviction comes to the appellate court with a presumption of correctness. Hitchcock v. State, 413 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1982); State v. Clements, 668 So.2d 980, 981 (Fla. 1996). In moving for a judgment of acquittal a defendant admits all facts and evidence at trial and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from such evidence. Corpoz v. State, 733 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Woods v. State, 733 So.2d 980 (Fla..1999). On review, the appellate court must view the conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to the state. Id. An appellant=s claim of insufficient evidence will not prevail if substantial competent evidence exists to support the verdict. Id. The standard of review of a trail court=s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is whether the trial court abused it=s discretion. Terry v. State, 668 So.2d 954 (Fla. 1996). If substantial competent evidence exists to support the jury=s verdict the case will not be overturned on appeal. Id.
III.
The appellant was charged with a violation of section 322.34, Florida Statutes (2000), which
provides:
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(2) Any person whose driver=s license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, . . . who, knowing of such cancellation, suspension, or revocation, drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, upon :
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(b) A second conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, . . ..
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The element of knowledge is satisfied if the person has been previously cited as provided in subsection (1); or the person admits to knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation, or the person received notice as provided in subsection (4). There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the knowledge requirement is satisfied if a judgment or order as provided in subsection (4) appears in the department=s records for any case except for one involving a suspension by the department for failure to pay a traffic fine or for a financial responsibility violation.
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(3) In any proceeding for a violation of this section, a court may consider evidence, other than that specified in subsection (2), that the person knowingly violated this section.
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IV.
The appellant argues two points on appeal. First, the appellant argues that since his testimony at trial that he did not receive notice of the suspension was uncontroverted by the state, the testimony is sufficient to rebut any presumption that he had knowledge of the suspension. However, review of the record reveals that although the appellant testified that he did not receive notice of the suspension, he did not in any way to corroborate this assertion. Here, the trial judge specifically found the appellant was not credible. (T 19) Weight and credibility are solely within the province of the fact finder; the appellate court=s only function is to determine sufficiency as a matter of law. State v. Santomaso, 764 So.2d 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Stewart v. State, 672 So.2d 865 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Chaudoin v State, 362 So.2d 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). Conflicts in evidence and questions about witness= credibility will not justify reversal when evidence is legally sufficient to support conviction. Wetherington v. State, 263 So.2d 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). The reviewing court should not substitute its opinion of the facts for that of the trier of fact. Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 1981); State v. McIntyre, 393 So.2d 16 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
Second, the appellant argues that the rebuttable presumption of knowledge should not apply in this case where the appellant=s license was suspended for failing to pay child support. Specifically, the appellant argues that the presumption does not apply in cases involving a suspension by the department for failure to pay a traffic fine or for a financial responsibility violation. However, as pointed out by the appellee, a review of chapter 324, Florida Statutes (2000) shows that the Financial Responsibility Statute refers to license suspensions related to insurance and judgment, but not child support. The authority to suspend driver=s licenses for child support violations is found in section 322.245, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, since the judgment of child support violation appeared in the department records, and since these records were placed in evidence, the element of knowledge was proven. Therefore, this court finds that there was legally sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the ruling of the county court is AFFIRMED.
ORDERED February 2002.
Charles B. Curry, Chief Judge