IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
FOR HARDEE, HIGHLANDS, AND
POLK COUNTY, FLORIDA

APPEAL NO.: 00-36

COUNTY CASE NO.: TT00-000028-XX

ROBERT HILTON,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

________________________

OPINION

This is an appeal of a jury verdict convicting Robert Hilton, Appellant, of fleeing to elude and resisting without violence, in the county court of Highlands County, Judge Olin Shinholser presiding. Appellant raises two issues on appeal; whether the trial court erred in allowing improper impeachment and whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. This court has jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(c)(1)(A). The ruling of the county court is AFFIRMED.

I.

On December 20, 1999, at approximately midnight, Officer Davidson saw a car that he knew belonged to the appellant drive through the intersection where he was parked. (V2: T20-21) The windows were very tinted. (V2: T21) Officer Davidson knew that the appellant had a restricted driver's license which he was only supposed to use for business purposes. (V2: T21, 36) Since it was late at night, the officer activated his lights to see if the appellant was driving. (V2: T21) The man in the car, identified as Mr. Hilton, saw the officer pull in behind the car. He was behind a vacant building. (V2: T21) The appellant exited the vehicle and the officer asked the appellant if he had a restricted license. (V2: T22) The appellant indicated that he did. (V2: T22) When the officer asked where the appellant was going, he stated that the building was his destination. The lot was the location of R&R Car Wash, and appellant was part owner of the business. (V2: T22) The appellant's car was the only car in the area at that time. (V2: T23) The officer told appellant that he was not supposed to be driving since the business was not open for customers at night. After the conversation with the officer, the appellant walked away and waited for the officer to leave the area. The officer drove away because he had not confirmed that the appellant had a restricted license. Once appellant saw that the officer was gone, he proceeded to drive his vehicle again. (V2: 153-154) Officer Davidson then confirmed that the appellant had a restricted license and intended to issue a summons to him for the traffic violation.

At that point, Officer Wilbur responded to the scene as a back-up officer. Davidson told Wilbur what had happened and then drove north. Officer Wilbur drove south and saw the appellant driving away from the lot. Officer Wilbur attempted to initiate a stop. Officer Wilbur testified that he put on his overhead lights but the appellant refused to yield. Instead, the appellant continued driving, turning south on South Highlands and continuing one to two blocks until turning eastbound on East 20^th Street. The appellant continued driving until he turned into a driveway later identified as his parents home. All the while, Officer Wilbur followed the appellant, approximately one half of a car length away with his overhead lights on. (V2: T53) Officer Davidson went to assist. Upon arriving at the residence, Officer Wilbur exited his vehicle and and called to appellant to exit his vehicle. (V2: T54) The appellant refused. Officer Davidson arrived at Mr. Hilton's parents house and saw Officer Wilbur standing by the driver's door of the appellant's car. He was trying to make the appellant get out of the car. Appellant locked the car doors and yelled obscenities. Appellant wanted to know why he was being arrested, and Officer Wilbur tried to explain while commanding him out of the car. The appellant began to roll up his window and made a phone call on a cell phone. Officer Wilbur used a flashlight to stop the window from going up. Soon appellant's parents came out of the house. The appellant's father spoke with the officers and then told his son to get out of the car. Mr. Hilton stepped out of the a passenger side door. At that point, they placed him in custody.

II.

Appellant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to use improper impeachment during the trial. Appellant concedes that trial counsel never objected to any of the testimony being offered or requested an offer of proof. Florida Statute 924.051(3) (2001) provides that an appeal may be taken in a criminal case only when the error is properly preserved. In order to preserve an issue, there must be a contemporaneous objection to the evidence and the precise legal argument put forth on appeal must have been presented below and ruled on by the trial court. Tillman v. State, 471 So.2d 32 (Fla. 1985); Florida Statute 924.051(1)(b) (2001). Since a specific and timely objection is necessary to preserve the error, this court must affirm the conviction. Sheffield v. State, 585 So.2d 396 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). However, as noted in appellant's brief, further evidentiary development is necessary to determine whether or not the appellant has a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Fla. R. Crim.P. 3.850 (2001); Blanco v. Wainright, 507 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 1987).

III.

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. In moving for a judgment of acquittal, the movant admits facts in evidence and every conclusion favorable to the state's case that the jury might reasonably infer. State v. Blanco, 702 So.2d 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Lynch v. State, 293 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1974). A motion for a directed verdict of acquittal should not be granted unless it is apparent that no legally sufficient evidence has been submitted upon which a jury could convict. Brown v. State, 294 So.2d 128 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Spera v. State, 656 So.2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). On appeal, the appellate court must view the conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to jury's verdict. Peterka v. State, 640 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1994); Cochran v. State, 547 So.2d 928 (Fla. 1989). So long as competent, substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict, it will not be overturned on appeal. Woods v. State, 733 So.2d 980 (Fla. 1999); Peterka v. State, 640 So.2d 59, 68 (Fla. 1994). Substantial evidence is evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as an adequate support for the conclusion reached. Cohen v. State, 99 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1957); De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1957).

In this case, the appellant was found guilty of fleeing or attempting to elude law enforcement officers in violation of Section 316.1935(1) of the Florida Statutes (1999). That section provides that:

It is unlawful for the operator of any vehicle, having knowledge that he or she has been ordered to stop such vehicle by a duly authorized law enforcement officer, willfully to refuse or to fail to stop the vehicle in compliance with such order or, having stopped in knowing compliance with such order, willfully to flee in an attempt to elude the officer, . . .

The appellant argues that the he did not know that the officer was trying to

pull him over at first, but that when he realized the officer wanted him to stop, he drove to his mother's driveway which was approximately a football field size away. Thus, he argues, the state has failed to prove all of the elements of the crime. He further argues that since there was no legal reason for the officer to arrest the appellant, he was not guilty in resisting the officer without violence by sitting in the car.

At trial, Officer Wilbur testified that he initiated a traffic stop on a car

driven by the appellant because the appellant was driving in violation of drivers license restriction charge, after Officer Davidson had told him that he could not. Officer Wilbur first saw the appellant near the car wash location. The officer put on his emergency lights and drove about a half car length away from the appellant. The appellant did not speed or try to get away from the officer but he did not pull over and continued to drive 3 or 4 blocks to a driveway before stopping. The car wash was 2,500 feet from the house. When appellant pulled into the driveway, Officer Wilbur got out of his cruiser and approached the appellant's car. Although ordered, the appellant would not exit the vehicle for ten minutes. When the appellant ignored the officer, Officer Wilbur told the appellant that he was under arrest. The appellant became upset, shouted obscenities and asked the officer why he was being arrested. Officer Wilbur told him he was under arrest for violating his driving restrictions. When the officer tried to open the car door, the appellant locked the door. When the appellant attempted to close the window, the officer stuck his flashlight in the window. Appellant was talking on a phone to his father. Officer Wilbur did not threaten the appellant or display a weapon. Appellant, although ordered, did not exit the vehicle for approximately ten minutes. This court finds that the officer had a legal reason for the stop and further finds that trial court did not err in denying the appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal.

Accordingly, the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress is AFFIRMED.

ORDERED this day of October 2001.

Charles B. Curry, Chief Judge