IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT
FOR HARDEE, HIGHLANDS, AND
POLK COUNTY, FLORIDA
Appeal No.: DD-39
County Case No.: 99-CC11-2697
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant/Appellant,
vs.
JOHNNIE M. ATMORE,
Plaintiff/Appellee.
_________________________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
This matter came before the court on appeal from the county court of Polk County, Judge Michael E. Raiden presiding. Johnnie Atmore (Atmore) brought an action against her insurance carrier, State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm). The trial court entered an order for payment of attorney
=s fees and costs on January 19, 2001, awarding Atmore attorney=s fees. State Farm filed an appeal. The parties presented oral argument on the appeal January 11, 2001. This court has jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030. Reversed and remanded.I.
Atmore was injured in an automobile accident on September 27, 1997. (V1; R1-5). In June 1999, State Farm denied Atmore no-fault benefits for continued chiropractic treatment based upon an independent medical examination. On August 30, 1999, Atmore filed a lawsuit for no-fault benefits. In Atmore=s Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories dated January 28, 2000, Atmore indicated that she was seeking damages in the amount of $275.00 for outstanding bills for chiropractic treatment. In addition, Atmore reiterated in her Supplemental Answers that she was bringing the lawsuit to obtain benefits for continuing future treatment. (V6; R. 269-282) On February 21, 2000, based on Atmore=s discovery response, State Farm mailed to Atmore=s counsel a check for $340.00 (outstanding damages plus statutory interest) representing full and final settlement on any and all claims plus accrued statutory interest. (V6; R. 283) In the cover letter, State Farm advised that the amount of the check Arepresents the outstanding medical expenses at issue in this file as well as statutory interest,@ and requested plaintiff=s attorney Aprovide a reasonable figure of attorney= fees and costs.@ The check itself had the following language: Afor full and final settlement on any and all claims exclusive of statutory interest re: the MVA of 9/27/97.@ Counsel for Atmore returned the check on February 25, stating that the Amain@ issue, (the issue of Atmore=s entitlement to future treatment under the policy) was left unresolved by State Farm=s attempted confession. (V6; R285-286) At a discovery motion March 3, 2000, Atmore contended that State Farm had not confessed judgment in the case because State Farm had not agreed to pay the remaining policy limits of $4,000.00 representing the payment for future damages. (V6; T338) State Farm never confessed judgment or offered to settle Atmore=s Afuture entitlement@ claim.
State Farm filed a motion for protective order seeking a determination by the court that further discovery was rendered moot by virtue of State Farm=s payment of outstanding disputed bills. (V1; R 35-36). The trial court granted State Farm=s motion. (V1; R50) Atmore filed a motion for rehearing/reconsideration citing Peachtree Casualty Company v. Walden, 759 So.2d 7 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) as authority for her position that she was entitled to proceed with a claim to recover future damages. (V1; R 51-52). The trial court agreed, and on April 13, 2000, entered an order vacating its previous order. (V1; R 60-66)
On May 26, 2000, the parties attended a discovery motion hearing. Prior to the hearing, counsel had settlement discussions. (V2; R 218) The court opened the hearing by expressing its understanding that Athe motion for discovery sanctions has been mooted out by discussions between Mr. Bunn [counsel for Atmore] and Mr. Oxendine [counsel for State Farm]@ to the effect that State Farm Aagrees to pay any outstanding bills that have been submitted on behalf of Mr. Bunn=s client,@ totaling $195.00, plus a reasonable attorney=s fee to be determined, if necessary, after evidentiary hearing. Counsel for State Farm stated his belief that State Farm had already confessed judgment on the bills in February 2000, and had agreed to pay bills Atmore incurred after State Farm did the cut off.. (V2; R 219-220) On August 16, 2000 a hearing was held on Atmore=s motion to tax attorney=s fees and costs. (V4). At that hearing, Atmore argued that her entitlement to attorney=s fees extended through May 26, 2000 when, according to Atmore, a settlement occurred between the parties when State Farm agreed to pay $195.00 for the outstanding bills in addition to the $340.00 which was previously tendered by State Farm on February 21, 2000. At the close of that hearing, the court posed several open ended questions regarding the dollar amount of medical bills outstanding as well as whether there had been a settlement at the May 26, 2000 hearing. No formal rulings were ever made at that hearing.
On October 6, 2000, a separate hearing was held on State Farm=s motion for summary judgment. (V5; R. 240-293) The questions raised by the trial court at the August 16 hearing were subsequently addressed during the October 6, 2000 hearing. Although State Farm argued that its efforts to settle the case cut-off the attorney=s fees in February, 2000, the trial court specifically rejected this notion through the entry of its October 30, 2000 order on motion for summary judgment which addressed both the August 16 and October 6 hearings. The October 30, 2000 order granted in part and denied in part State Farm=s motion for summary judgment. The order denied Atmore=s claim for future benefits but as a result of State Farm=s continued assurances that it had agreed to pay plaintiff=s outstanding medical bills, the October 30, 2000 order held that State Farm=s motion for summary judgement Ais granted to the extent that State Farm has now paid or agreed to pay all bills outstanding.@ (V 3; R231) Thereafter, on December 8, 2000 the court entered an order canceling status conference and directing submission of memoranda on taxable costs.(V8; R 400-401). This order was entered without hearing. In its order the court stated that the only remaining issues to be determined in the case is the amount of attorney=s fees and costs to be assessed against State Farm. The court noted Athat is, by having paid or agree to pay all outstanding medical bills and prejudgment interest, [State Farm] has effectively confessed judgment.@(V8; R 400) Once the affidavits were submitted to the court, a lengthy detailed order for payment of attorney=s fees and costs was entered on January 19, 2001. That order awarded 83 hours of attorney=s the Atmore=s lawyers. (V6; R 388) The January order further applied a multiplier of 2.0. The order did not include the alleged date of State Farm=s confession, however, it did reject State Farms= position that it had previously confessed judgment in the case in February 2000. In a letter to counsel dated May 11, 2001, the lower court stated that its fee award was premised on a separate agreement to pay made by State Farm sometime between October 6, 2000 and December 8, 2000. (V8; R431) Atmore was awarded $42,480.56 in fees and costs.
State Farm served a February 16, 2001 notice of appeal which only identified the October 30, 2000 order on motion for summary judgment which was attached to the notice of appeal. No mention of the January 19, 2001 order was made. (V3; R233-241) State Farm=s notice of appeal described the October 30, 2000 order as being a Afinal order.@ (V3; R 233) This defective notice of appeal triggered several motions by the parties on appeal and resulted in the entry of six orders by the Second DCA. State Farm, in its response to the Second DCA=s order to show cause, eventually took the position that its appeal was intended to address the January 19, 2001 order for payment of attorney=s fees and costs, as opposed to the order attached to its notice of appeal. (V8; R413)
II.
On April 27, 2001, jurisdiction was relinquished to the trial court for State Farm to obtain entry of an appealable final summary judgment from the trial court. (V8; R410) The trial court corresponded with counsel by means of letters dated May 2, 2001 and May 11, 2001, both of which again mentioned the court=s finding that the parties had settled the case. (V8; R406; 431) The court=s May 2 letter invited the parties to submit a proposed order to the court and offered an expedited hearing in connection with the relinquishment of jurisdiction. (V8; R407) The court=s May 11 letter renewed the offer for the parties to set a hearing and explained that Ano order will be entered without one.@ (V8; R. 432) Subsequently Appellant set the case for a case management conference on May 25, 2001. That hearing concluded without the entry of any further order by the trial court. There was also no court reporter present. After expiration of the thirty-day relinquishment period, the Second DCA proceeded to transfer this appeal to the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court due to a lack of jurisdiction for the appeal of the order from the county court. Neither the questions of great public importance contained in the October 30, 2000 order, nor the hourly rate, multiplier, or number of hours awarded prior to February 2000, are addressed as issues in State Farm=s initial brief . Instead State Farm limits this appeal to the January 19, 2001 order, which awarded found that plaintiff was entitled to attorney=s fees for hours incurred after February, 2000.
III.
State Farm argues that the trial court committed reversible error because there are only two events that would have triggered attorney=s fees in this case: (1) that State Farm=s confessed judgment by paying all outstanding bills on February 21, which was rejected by the trial court ;or (2) that settlement occurred on May 26, 2000, which was also rejected by the trial court. Thus, State Farm argues that since neither event occurred in this case, there exists no basis for an award of attorney= fees. This court agrees. Although there are vague and scant references in the trial transcripts and correspondence between the lawyers and the judge referencing a Asettlement@, there has never been a specific finding by the trial court of settlement and when that settlement became effective.
Accordingly, this cause is REVERSED and REMANDED to the trial court for the purposes of entering an order with a specific finding as to whether or not there was indeed a settlement and if so, when that settlement became effective and enter an appropriate order for fees and costs accordingly.
ORDERED January 2002
Charles B. Curry
Chief Judge